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THE DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD OF
STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Richard A. Epstein*
I. BACKGROUND CONUNDRUMS
Judge Jeffrey S. Sutton on the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit is perhaps this nation’s most sophisticated expositor and articulate champion of state constitutional law. On multiple occasions he
has taken the position that lawyers should be well aware that, on economic liberties like any other issue, they have two shots at striking
down an unwelcome state law on constitutional grounds, one federal
and one state. The conventional wisdom, he observes, often overlooks this double-barreled possibility by taking the view that the federal constitution is, pick your metaphor, the only game in town or the
fount of all wisdom. As such its allure is so powerful that lawyers of

*
Laurence A. Tisch Professor of Law, New York University School of Law,
The Peter and Kirsten Bedford Senior Fellow, The Hoover Institution, and the James
Parker Hall Distinguished Service Professor of Law, Emeritus and Senior Lecturer,
The University of Chicago. This paper was prepared for the Conference on Economic
Liberties and the Constitution, to be held at NYU Law School on April 10, 2015, sponsored by the Institute for Justice. My thanks to Rachel Bukberg and Krista Perry, The
University of Chicago Law School Class of 2016, for their usual excellent research assistance.
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all political stripes move heaven and earth to get into federal courts
in order to present their case.
That tendency to prefer federal courts gained strength during the
New Deal, when progressive litigants went into federal courts in order to uphold legislation that cut down on the scope of constitutional
protection for economic liberties1 or to expand federal power over all
economic activities, not just the shipment of goods and the movement of people across state lines.2 Making an issue into a federal case
became a moral imperative for the progressive cause on questions
such as the National Labor Relations Act, 3 the Agricultural Adjustment Act,4 and the Motor Vehicle Acts,5 all of which were intended
to curb the traditional exercise of economic liberties. That move to
federal courts had added urgency at the height of the civil rights
movement (roughly speaking, in the 20 or so years after the end of
World War II) when state courts, especially in the Old South, were
firmly controlled by segregationists who did all they could to thwart
such key federal decisions as Brown v. Board of Education.6 One such
illustration was the now forgotten case of Naim v. Naim,7 in which the
Virginia Supreme Court upheld a statute that forbade marriage between a white person and a person of the opposite sex of another
race. Clearly some federal constitutional remedy was needed, but
owing to the turmoil that followed Brown, the anti-miscegenation
statutes did not fall until Loving v. Virginia received a hero’s welcome

See, e.g., West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
3 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2012)
4 Pub. L. No. 73-10, 48 Stat. 31 (1933) (replaced by the Agricultural Adjustment Act
of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-430, 52 Stat. 31).
5 Pub. L. No. 74-255, 49 Stat. 543.
6 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
7 See, e.g., Naim v. Naim, 87 S.E.2d 749 (Va. 1955).
1
2
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in 1967.8 Just several years before, in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,9
the United States Supreme Court had intervened by using First
Amendment arguments to overturn an inflated $500,000 defamation
award sustained by the Alabama Supreme Court that could have
bankrupted the New York Times. State constitutional law did not
seem to be a source of meaningful judicial relief. But it did seem to
be the source of legal interventions that could undermine our free
institutions.
That was then, and this is now, at a time when state courts do not
display the manifestly bad behaviors of the past. But then again, who
would have thought that during the 1880s the United States Supreme
Court would be in-step with state courts on issues of race relations,
so that the civil rights movement was frustrated at both the federal
and state level? Yet now that the new era has come, the old reluctance
to rely on the states and hence on state constitutions has largely disappeared. But the answer to Sutton’s question of whether it is a salutary move to rely on state constitutions cannot be answered authoritatively unclear unless and until we know how state courts will exercise their new found constitutional powers.
On this score the picture is complex on all matters pertaining economic liberties because state constitutions do in some fundamental
ways at least differ from the United States Constitution. The most
obvious difference is that the United States Constitution, at least in
its inception, was a constitution that afforded “few and defined”

8 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), overruling Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583
(1883), thus removing all racial restrictions on marriage. Pace was written by Justice
Stephen J. Field, himself something of a libertarian, who held that the statute did not
violate the equal protection clause because it proscribed identical punishments to the
white and black members of the couple. Note that the decision makes a grim kind of
sense on an equal protection ground, but offers no comfort to the state if both parties
challenge the case as an infringement of basic liberties. At that point, police-power
arguments have to be addressed, and none were mentioned in Pace.
9 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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powers to the central government.10 In contrast, powers of the state
governments were defined generically to cover all standard government activities, less those that the United States Constitution had
vested in the federal government. That diffuse state power was exceedingly broad prior to the New Deal expansion of federal power.
Yet those additional post-1937 federal powers were too broad to be
read as exclusive, without stripping the states of any power to regulate routine economic matters. Accordingly, the political economy of
the post-New Deal era therefore stressed concurrent powers, so that
often the major inquiry was whether the federal government had, either expressly or impliedly, preempted the authority of the states. 11
In many areas, most notably in education, finance land-use, and consumer affairs, the states continue to exercise extensive powers sideby-side with the federal government. Courts must still confront cases
in which federal and state power clash. But today, states often want
the federal government to backstop state regulation. 12 Elsewhere, the
federal government explicitly allows states a wide range of actions,
so that states may, for example, increase the federal minimum wage
but not reduce it. This cooperative form of federalism thus increases
powers at both levels,13 and thereby complicates the classical liberal

10 For the most famous articulation of that principal, see THE FEDERALIST NO. 45
(James Madison).
11 For the standard tests, see Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947).
12 United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121 (1985), where numerous
state attorneys general supported the expansive reading of the phrase “waters of the
United States.” See also, the same federal-state alignment in Rapanos v. United States,
547 U.S. 715 (2006).
13 For a
defense of this view, see MALCOLM FEELEY & EDWARD L.
RUBIN, FEDERALISM: POLITICAL IDENTITY AND TRAGIC COMPROMISE (2008); Symposium, Federalism as the New Nationalism, 123 YALE L.J. 1889. For doubts about this cooperative vision, see Richard A. Epstein & Mario Loyola, Saving Federalism, 20
NATIONAL AFFAIRS 3 (2014). That article addresses one key aspect of the problem: the
ability of the federal government to condition grants that force states to conform to its
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quest for limited government. In addition, it is clear that state constitutions intentionally confer certain management duties to state government, which in turn require them to exercise, at least in the first
instance, their own best business judgment on how these institutions
should operate. To take but one provision among hundreds, the Arizona Constitution now requires that the state set up everything from
kindergarten common schools to high schools, normal schools, industrial schools and universities.14 Thus it is no surprise that modern
writers on state constitutions treat them as a fount of positive rights
on such matters as education, worker rights, and environmental protection.15 Yet at the same time, the Arizona Constitution also contains
phrases dealing with due process of law (section 4), the right to petition and assembly (section 5), freedom of speech and press (article 6),
privacy (section 8) and privileges and immunities (section 9). It is
therefore highly difficult to sort out the warring tensions.
In this article, I shall trace out two potential conflicts that address
matters fundamental to economic liberties, using pension reform and
public education as the analytical lens. The first conflict is that between positive and negative rights and the second is that between
the federal and state constitutions.
II. PENSION REFORM UNDER STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
To see how these cross currents work, I shall start with a discussion of one of the major challenges that exists today at the state level,

will. It does not address the other side, where states, with the blessing of Congress,
extend their protections of positive rights.
14 ARIZ. CONST. art. XI, available at http://www.azleg.gov/Constitution.asp.
15 See, e.g., Jeffery Sutton, Courts as Change Agents: Do We Want More – Or Less?, 127
HARV. L. REV. 1419(2014) (reviewing EMILY ZACKIN, LOOKING FOR RIGHTS IN ALL THE
WRONG PLACES: WHY STATE CONSTITUTIONS CONTAIN AMERICA’S POSITIVE RIGHTS
(2013)).

728

New York University Journal of Law & Liberty [Vol. 9:723

which derives from the unsustainable growth of pension obligations.16 To frame the problem, it is important to note that there are
two types of pension programs: defined contribution and defined
benefits. These differ primarily in their assignments of which party
takes the risk of fluctuations in market value in the retirement fund.
The overall situation is relatively tranquil under defined contribution plans, which are used for university professors under TIAACREF.17 Under these arrangements, the employer’s obligation is to
pay a certain amount of money each year into a pension fund, which
then vests in the employer when paid over. The employee then decides how to invest that money in both the short and long run. In
practice, employees receive some assistance in investing their TIAACREF funds, often from TIAA-CREF itself. Most employees tend to
invest in diversified portfolios whose financial assets are divided between stocks and bonds.
The key advantages of this system are two. First, since the benefits vest, on any job change the employee does not have to forfeit either the employer contributions or the subsequent appreciation to
the fund. Hence the labor market is far more mobile than it is under
defined benefit plans, where it is often uncertain whether or not the
contributions made to date have generated accrued benefits, however defined. The second great advantage of the defined contribution
plan is that it never goes insolvent. The rights are fully vested in the
employee, who now chooses his or her investment and payout strategies. One common formula tends to increase the fraction of bond or

16 For one useful compilation of this information, see Amy Monahan, State Fiscal
Constitutions and the Law and Politics of Public Pensions, U. ILL. L. REV. 117 (2015), from
which much of this data is drawn.
17 For information on these plans, see TIAA-CREF, Defined Contribution/Retirement Plans, available at https://www.tiaa-cref.org/public/products-services/retirement/employer-sponsored/defined-contribution.
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other fixed-income investments (e.g., real estate leases) as the employee gets older. The reasoning is that as the time to payout gets
closer, the employee has fewer opportunities to offset bad years by
getting higher yields in the next profitable period. The employee also
has distribution options, which usually involve the selection of some
type of annuity payment, which is keyed either to his or her life, or
to a self-and-survivor annuity, usually tied to a spouse. Under this
system, the employee has an exact knowledge of the amount of
money available at any time. That information is not available, for
example, in Social Security programs that list a set of options to the
plan enrollee without giving any information as to the present value
of the assets in the plan. In general, the consensus is that these plans
perform well, which explains their increased popularity in the private sector.
Defined benefit plans operate on the reverse principle, such that
no rights are necessarily vested in the employee at the time that the
employer makes contributions to the fund. Instead, under these
plans, the parties agree by contract that the worker shall upon retirement receive benefits in accordance with some preexisting formula
that could be modified over the life of the plan. In effect, the employer takes the risk, up and down, from fluctuations in the portfolio
of assets set aside to fund the future obligations, including those for
retirement and disability. In those cases where the investment portfolio outperforms expectations, the employer can, over the deep
grumbling of the employees, remove excess funds from the pool. But
where the portfolio performance has been low on a cumulative basis,
which has been the case for the last 15 or so years, the employer (including any public employer) is obligated to make up the difference
from its own revenues, which for public employees comes from increases in tax revenues or in cutting other employer services.
In one sense, therefore, the problem is that which faced Wilkins
Micawber in Charles Dickens’ David Copperfield: "Annual income
twenty pounds, annual expenditure nineteen [pounds] nineteen
[shillings] and six [pence], result happiness. Annual income twenty
pounds, annual expenditure twenty pounds ought and six, result

730

New York University Journal of Law & Liberty [Vol. 9:723

misery." Dickens was always weak on financial matters, for this quotation does not allow for borrowing or saving to even out any shortterm imbalance. But the objection carries weight nonetheless in the
area of pension, which involves the far greater challenge of figuring
out how to balance the accounts over a generation, or indeed a lifetime, where more than a single shilling is at stake. At this point, it is
not just a question of adding up pounds or dollars. It is a much more
complex calculation that at a minimum requires that one take into
account the future rate of earnings from a given fund over a long period of time, an analysis of future changes in the anticipated date of
retirement, and a calculation of the expected lifespan of plan members and their beneficiaries. These judgments have to be made not
just at the time of the distribution of the funds, when the revenues
from a defined contribution plan are annuitized. They also have to
be made continuously over the life of the fund, taking into account
as well any changes in the legal environment. Clearly this task has
gone astray, for at present, best estimates are that public employee
pension funds contain about $2.8 trillion in assets, subject to an anticipated liability in present value terms of about $3.8 trillion.18
The situation is worse than it appears because the financial effects of the dislocations are likely to fall on future recipients even if
at present all current retirees continue to receive their full pension
benefits. But at the same time, the immediate ramifications for current state and municipal budgets are enormous because the applicable cuts must be made today in other government programs in order

Alicia H. Munnell et al., The Funding of State and Local Pensions: 2012-2016, CENTER
RETIREMENT RESEARCH AT BOSTON COLLEGE 1, 2–3 (2013), available at
http://crr.bc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/slp_32-508.pdf: “In the aggregate,
the actuarial value of assets amounted to $2.8 trillion and liabilities amounted to $3.8
trillion, producing a funded ratio of 73 percent.”
18

FOR
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to maintain employer contributions up to some acceptable level. Before the case settled, I worked on these issues for the City of San Jose
in connection with its defense of Measure B, whose full title is Article
XV-A Retirement, Public Employee Pension Plan Amendments—to
Ensure Fair and Sustainable Retirement Benefits While Preserving
Essential City Services.
It is still worth while to review the history of that proposal, which
was adopted by the voters on February 8, 2012 and approved by the
City Council on March 6, 2012.19 The purpose of the Amendment was
to make cuts in the pension benefits of future retirees—not to help
the notorious top one percent, but in order to ensure sufficient funding for “services [that] are essential to the health, safety, quality of
life and well‐being of San Jose residents: police protection; fire protection; street maintenance; libraries; and community centers.” 20
These programs had been subject to major cuts in order to fund pensions when the fund was about $1 billion in debt. But Measure B was
struck down on state constitutional grounds as an impairment of the
vested rights of contract. At this point, the dark side of state constitutional law bears on two questions. The first is how the large deficits
accrued in the first place. The second is why the efforts to take steps
to control them were thwarted by the assertion of state constitutional
rights.
So why then the deficits? The answer to this question depends
on the assumptions that are used to fund future liabilities. It is well
known that the sum of money put into a pension program today will
grow by the time that it will have to be paid out. But the question is
at what rate. If one assumes that a balanced portfolio will grow at a

19 The full title is Article XV-A Retirement, Public Employee Pension Plan Amendments—to Ensure Fair and Sustainable Retirement Benefits While Preserving Essential
City Services, which was adopted by the voters on February 8, 2012 and approved by
the City Council on March 6, 2012.
20 Id. at Section 1501-A FINDINGS.
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high rate of interest—eight percent on accumulated investment is a
common number—then a small amount of cash need be set aside in
the early years. But if the actual rate of growth in pension fund assets
is lower than the stipulated rate, the ultimate fiscal shortfalls could
prove enormous, as the aggregate $1 trillion unfunded liability
shows. The situation is not likely to get better soon when in recent
years interest on long-term debt instruments has hovered around
two percent and the stock market growth has been relatively low
compared to around 15 years ago.
This fiscal problem results in part from the powerful pressures
placed on political officials and their budgetary staffs to use estimates
that reduce the amounts of money that have to be set aside in any
given year to fund these programs on an actuarially sound basis. Citizens are not shareholders, so that future fund liabilities are not set
off against their current assets, as tends to happen in connection with
corporate firms that more readily convert future liabilities to their
present value. But the citizenry of any community, state or especially
local, can exit the jurisdiction without having to pick up their pro rata
share of future losses. Similarly, local officials are worried about the
deficits that appear on their books today, and not those in future generations, so that they too have some incentive to inflate short-term
gains while inviting long-term losses. The point here should not be
overstated. Any governor or mayor who has to deal with the immediate decline in local services and with requests for higher taxes is
bearing the brunt of what happens. But the sad truth, given the size
of the problem, is that the rot can set in even before the local services
are cut or the taxes are increased, so that the problem can with time
snowball into a huge shortfall.
The basic public choice dynamic is of course not unknown to
lawmakers and the actuaries who offer them advice. So the question
then is what should be done about it. Oftentimes the stated legislation tries to forestall these problems by working actuarial standards
into the law. On this score, the central question is whether any future
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payment program will be adequately funded today. That precise issue that arises with pension laws was faced 25 years ago with the
long-term funding of automobile insurance funds on which, full disclosure, I worked as a consultant for Allstate Insurance in connection
with the operation of the assigned-risk program that New Jersey had
developed to deal with the consistent cost overruns in its automobile
insurance market. 21 The Fair Automobile Insurance Reform Act of
199022 was passed in response to a breakdown in insurance markets
for assigned risks. That statute came at the end of a complex process,
in which the liability for future losses—just like the liability for future
pensions—was kicked down the road.
The problem is simple to state, hard to solve. Drivers do not have
equal risks. Some are much more dangerous than others. From the
point of view of a rational insurance company—and these companies
know how to calculate premiums—they have to charge individual
drivers the expected value of their losses, which puts the coverage
out of reach for some high-risk parties. But it is politically unacceptable to keep these drivers off the road (however great the safety benefits) so they are placed in assigned risks pools where they can obtain
coverage at a subsidized rate. It is therefore necessary to assign, usually by rotation, those losing risks to the various carriers who do business in the state, usually in accordance with their market share. But
to make this assigned-risk pool work, it is necessary to obtain subsidies from market-rate customers, which cannot be done in a competitive market when all the companies will bid the amount of the recoupment down to zero in an effort to gain favorable contracts.

21 For a more complete account of these issues, see Richard A. Epstein, A Clash of
Two Cultures: Will the Tort System Survive Automobile Insurance Reform?, 25 VAL. U. L.
REV. 173, 183 (1991).
22 1990 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. 8 (West) (“FAIRA”); 1990 Pa. Legis. Serv. 6 (Purdon);
Proposition 103 (codified as amended at CAL. INS. CODE §§ 1861.01–1861.16 (West
Supp. 1991)).
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One way to handle this problem is for the state to pay a subsidy
to every insurer that takes on assigned risk drivers, so that there need
be no disruption of the voluntary market. But rather than put tax
payments on-budget, in the run-up to FAIRA New Jersey formed a
Joint Underwriting Association (“JUA”) that bore the financial risks,
and that JUA then used insurance carriers to do its paper and managing work for these risky policies. But the system quickly unraveled.
The JUA had the power to impose a Residual Market Equalization
Charge on all policies issued in the state, to cover the insurer losses.
But the JUA neither raised rates nor imposed fees sufficient to offset
the short-term losses, even though by law the JUA was required to
set up “actuarially sound reserves”23 that would allow JUA operations to run on a “no loss, no profit” basis.24 As the deficits mounted,
FAIRA found, without benefit of a hearing, that the insurance carriers had been guilty of mismanagement of the underwriting and
claims process, so that it was appropriate to impose on them a $900
million extra fee for their neglect. FAIRA also allowed the legislature
to use new insurance dollars to go against the past losses in earlier
periods, which is an open invitation to financial ruin.
Notwithstanding these evident defects, the New Jersey Supreme
Court in a lengthy opinion refused to allow any facial state-law constitutional challenge to this rickety scheme, leaving the insurers with
the hopeless task of trying to win on costly as-applied challenges,
where one ready response was that future rate authorizations might
offset current shortfalls. 25 It is instructive that on these issues, the
court relied heavily on the rational-basis test cases of the United

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:30E-7(r) (West 1985).
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:30E-3(o) (West Supp. 1990).
25 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. State, 590 A.2d 191 (N.J. 1991).
23
24
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States Supreme Court.26 It is also worth noting that the 1937 Tax Injunction Act27 blocked any direct challenge in the federal courts so
that no one had standing to challenge these taxes until long after the
money was collected.
In the first instance, FAIRA looks like a case in which a strong
system of constitutionally protected property rights could have been
created and enforced in state courts. Nonetheless, its eager embrace
of some sanitized version of the rational-basis test precluded the
challenge. State Farm was an object lesson in the simple proposition
that state courts are not temperamentally willing to impose any restrictions on state taxation and expenditures, no matter how transparent the legislative ruse. The situation is of course no different at
the federal level, as there has been a supine judicial posture with respect to the financial irregularities of the Chrysler and GM bailouts, 28
and with the financial legerdemain in the judicial oversight of the
federal government’s notorious Third Amendment to the September
2008 financial bailout of Fannie and Freddie.29 The pathological risks
are the same at both the federal and the state levels.

See id. at 198 (citing Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934)).
28 U.S.C. § 1341: “The district courts shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State law where a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such State.” The last clause suggests that this
defense should be relatively broad, but historically the opposite has proved true. See
Clark R. Calhoun & Timothy L. Fallaw, Avoiding the TIA: Not Impossible, But Close, TAX
ANALYSTS Nov. 8, 2010, at 425, available at http://www.alston.com/Files/Publication/606933de-c4de-4c9b-b880-4c67e490d7fa/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/d3e983cc-3c3c-461e-8cdc-edf8961af634/Calhoun%20%20STN%20Avoiding%20TIA.pdf.
28 For my views, see Richard A. Epstein, Political Bankruptcies: How Chrysler and GM
Have Changed the Rules of the Game, THE FREEMAN (2009), available at http://www.thefreemanonline.org/featured/political-bankruptcies-how-chrysler-and-gm-havechanged-the-rules-of-the-game/.
29 For the painful details, see Richard A. Epstein, The Government Takeover of Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac: Upending Capital Markets with Lax Business and Constitutional
Standards, 10 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 379 (2014).
26
27
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These early warning signs tell us all that we need to know about
the prospects of getting judicial oversight over the funding of state
and local pension plans, which also depend on funding long-term
programs in ways that meet all relevant actuarial standards. The
public choice risks for underfunding are sufficiently high that these
plans cry out for some judicial oversight on the ground that the political process is heavily weighed to the protection of present claims
against future long-term solvency. In addition, as in the New Jersey
FAIRA case, the relevant statutes call for the use of actuarially sound
administrative procedures to insure long-term solvency.30
Yet, as Professor Amy Monahan reports in her study, the few
cases that have sought to open the investment strategies of these pension funds to judicial investigation have hit a blank wall for all of the
usual reasons.31 Thus in Kosa v. Treasurer of the State of Michigan,32 the
state defaulted on its constitutional obligation to make payments into
its retirement fund the year in which the liabilities were accrued,
much as under the New Jersey insurance scheme. Accordingly, when
the state unilaterally changed its accounting methods to reduce the
required level of its own contributions, the Michigan Supreme Court
punted on the issue, holding that acceptable so long as both methods
are in principle capable of achieving the desired long-term equilibrium. But this is all bravado. The payments were reduced under immediate fiscal pressures, which amounts to an open confession that

30 Thus the South Carolina statute provides: “The General Assembly shall annually
appropriate funds and prescribe member contributions for any state-operated retirement system which will insure the availability of funds to meet all normal and accrued
liability of the system on a sound actuarial basis as determined by the governing body
of the system.” S.C. CONST. art. X, § 16.
31 Amy B. Monahan, State Fiscal Constitutions and the Law and Politics of Public Pensions, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 117.
32 292 N.W.2d 452 (Mich. 1980), discussed in Monahan, supra note 30, at 149–50.
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these opportunistic changes could not meet the plan’s long-term financial objectives. The willingness to credit state pronouncements in
the face of serious financial objections creates the kind of lax scrutiny
that is an open invitation to a fiscal short fall.
Similarly in Professional Fire Fighters of New Hampshire v. New
Hampshire, 33 the court sidestepped yet another constitutional mandate for the use of sound actuarial practices to determine plan liabilities. 34 In this instance, the perverse doctrine of standing to block
challenges to a series of legislative practices became tantamount to a
virtual negation of the constitutional protection.35 More specifically,
the legislature adopted a statute that overrode the independent actuary’s determination that the high rates of return postulated for the
investment were unduly rosy, thereby knocking out the case for additional contributions. It also changed the governance structure of
the board, by replacing public employees with public employers, so
as to make sure that there would be no backsliding. The argument
that there was no present harm to potential recipients effectively immunizes a state constitutional provision from all review. In this regard, the imposition of the standing requirement has the same misguided effect as it had in the first of the standing cases, Frothingham
v. Mellon,36 where it prevented any systematic challenge to ultra vires
government behavior. Here too there is no effective enforcement of
the applicable funding constraints.
The final case that Monahan mentioned was Musselman v. Gover37
nor, which was intended to force Michigan to make adequate pro-

167 N.H. 188, (N.H. 2014).
N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 36-a.
35On which, see RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, THE CLASSICAL LIBERAL CONSTITUTION: THE
UNCERTAIN QUEST FOR LIMITED GOVERNMENT, chs. 6–7 (2014).
36 Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
37 533 N.W.2d 237 (Mich. 1995).
33
34
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vision for funding its healthcare benefits. Normally a writ of mandamus is available for that purpose, but in this instance it was denied
on the ground that the writ was not available to force the legislature
to make appropriations for any of its programs. The net effect on the
funding side is that the obligations in question were knowingly underfunded.
The second half of the pension problem relates to the question of
whether, and when, individual state employees have their pension
rights vested under the law. This question is distinct from the above
issue, because these rights can vest even if no adequate provision has
been made for funding the obligation. What happens is that the employees now bring suit to prevent the state from reducing the level
of benefits owing in these cases. In dealing with these issues, the appropriate point of departure is the standard practices that private employers adopt in the voluntary market. To be sure, there is immense
variation on this question, as the distinction between defined benefit
and defined contribution plans shows. But amid this variation one
point does remain clear: the time at which pension rights under a defined benefit plan vests is deferred until some period of service has
expired, and even then there are no vested benefits for services yet to
be rendered. The situation under public plans in some cases reflects
this point of view that the rights are not vested irretrievably, unless
the state has unmistakably indicated its intention to so do. Thus in
the 2014 version of Professional Fire Fighters of New Hampshire v. New
Hampshire,38 the New Hampshire court unanimously held that “legislative changes increasing the contribution rates paid by members
of the New Hampshire Retirement system” did not violate the Contracts Clauses of either the United States or the New Hampshire Constitutions. 39 The legislative change in question did not reduce the

38
39

See, Prof'l Fire Fighters of N.H. v. State of N.H., 107 A.3d 1229 (N.H. 2014).
Id. at 1231.
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vested period below the prior “ten years of creditable service” but
did increase the employee contribution from all classes of employees.40 The point taken in this case was that flexibility was preserved
on the ground that the earlier legislation did not unmistakably prevent the state from making this interpretation. 41 But even if one followed the preferred rule of ordinary interpretation, it seems as
though any employer would retain flexibility with respect to the
vesting of rights for work that has yet to be done. 42 These contracts
are not financial obligations in which the money has already been
paid over so that the only question is their timely repayment. Quite
the opposite, to the extent that both sides of the agreement are fully
executory, the usual rule is that each party can modify its position as
it sees fit unless there is some specific impairment in question. On
that view, it follows that the decision to cut back future contributions

40 “[F]or Group I members the rate increased from 5 percent to 7 percent; for Group
II permanent fire fighter members the rate increased from 9.3 percent to 11.80 percent;
and for Group II permanent police members the rate increased from 9.3 percent to
11.55 percent.” Id. (citing Laws 2011, 224:172; RSA 100-A:16, I(a) (Supp. 2010)
(amended 2011)).
41 Id. at 5. In United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 859 (1996), the United States
Supreme held that this doctrine meant “that the Government could not be held to a
promise to refrain from exercising its regulatory authority in the future unless that
promise was unmistakably clear in the contract,” which the Supreme Court then rejected. Id. at 881-87. Ironically, the New Hampshire Supreme Court wrote as if the
doctrine had been accepted, when it quoted this passage: “A requirement that the government's obligation unmistakably appear thus served the dual purposes of limiting
contractual incursions on a State's sovereign powers and of avoiding difficult constitutional questions about the extent of state authority to limit the subsequent exercise
of legislative power.” Prof'l Fire Fighters of New Hampshire, 107 A.3d 1234 (N.H. 2014).
This quotation refers to the government’s position in favor of the doctrine, which was
rejected by the Court in favor of the rule of ordinary interpretation. Winstar Corp., 518
U.S. 896 (1996).
42 For discussion, see Richard A. Epstein, The Upside Down Law of Property and Contract: Of Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and San Jose Pensions, 93 NEB. L. REV. 869 (2014).
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under existing, but open-ended contracts, is part of the ordinary discretion reserved to any employer, and thus survives without needing
any resort to the unmistakability doctrine invoked in New Hampshire
Fire Fighters.
These vesting issues have come to the fore in San Jose California,
where the vested rights—that is, those vested from the time of hiring—have precluded the changes that were introduced in Measure
B, which was approved by the voters. In dealing with this issue, the
trial judge, Patricia Lucas, relied heavily on well-established California precedents that treat these rights, under the so-called “California
rule,” as vested as from the date of initial employment: “courts in
California and the twelve other states that have adopted California's
precedent have held not only that state retirement statutes create contracts, but that they do so as of the first day of employment. The practical result of this rule is that pension benefits for current employees
cannot be detrimentally changed, even if the changes are purely prospective. Thus, the only readily available option for changing employee pension benefits in these states is to limit such changes to new
hires.” 43 This rule had its origins in the 1945 decision in Kern v. City
of Long Beach,44 where it was invoked in order to prevent the termination of benefits to Kern one month before he was due to retire after
20 years of service.
The California Supreme Court responded to that hiring abuse
with a massive case of overkill by holding that “the right to a pension
vests upon acceptance of employment.”45 But Measure B bore no resemblance to the Kern strategy insofar as it sought to reduce benefits
only to the extent that it was necessary to fund the other essential

43 See Amy B. Monahan, Statutes as Contracts? The “California Rule” and Its Impact on
Public Pension Reform, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1029, 1032 (2012).
44 Kern v. City of Long Beach, 179 P.2d 799 (Cal. 1947).
45 Id. at 801.
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civil service. Under a general rule that requires that these contract
modifications be made in good faith, this adjustment surely passes
muster because there was no attempt to wipe out the pension claims
that had already accrued, only to trim them to the point where other
essential services could be adequately supplied. Trustees are often
forced to choose among multiple claimants, and rarely does any trustee immunize one class of beneficiaries from all cuts. The steeper the
financial cuts in any given program, the larger the marginal dislocation. Finding an interior solution therefore tends to substitute in cuts
that necessarily do some harm for those that today necessarily bring
out far greater harm. It is manifestly impossible for any court to finetune the level of cuts made, which is why the exercise is normally
judged under a good-faith standard, which is common in many, but
by no means all, contract arrangements. 46
In this case, however, the question need not be left to implication,
for the San Jose Charter contains an explicit provision to “amend or
otherwise change” retirement plans, or in Section 1503 to “repeal or
amend” any retirement system.47 But that section itself has received
a very narrow interpretation so that, as stated in Betts v. Board of Administration, 48 “changes in a pension plan which result in disadvantage to employees should be accompanied by comparable new
advantages.”49 The upshot of this construction is that a power that

46 For the most famous articulation of the good-faith standard, see Wood v. Lucy,
Lady Duff-Gordon, 118 N.E. 214 (N.Y. 1917).
47 See SAN JOSE, CAL., CITY CHARTER, art. XV, § 1500 (1965) (amended Nov. 2, 2010)
(“Subject to other provisions of this Article, the Council may at any time, or from time
to time, amend or otherwise change any retirement plan or plans or adopt or establish
a new or different plan or plans for all or any officers or employees . . . .”); SAN JOSE,
CAL., CITY CHARTER, art. XV, § 1503 (1965) (“However, subject to other provisions of
this Article, the Council shall at all times have the power and right to repeal or amend
any such retirement system or systems, and to adopt or establish a new or different
plan or plans for all or any officers or employees.”).
48 582 P.2d 614 (Cal. 1978).
49 Id. at 617; see Allen v. City of Long Beach, 287 P.2d 765, 767 (Cal. 1955).
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was reserved to confer on San Jose the ability to manage its own affairs is read to mean that no changes that it can make can leave the
employees any worse off than they were before the changes took
place. At this point, no meaningful reform is possible because all
wholesale cuts in pension benefits are precluded as a matter of law,
which is the position that the court took in San Jose Police Officers’ Association v. City of San Jose.50
Now the worm has turned because the Officers held that the effort to undermine the vested rights in this case was a violation of the
federal Contracts Clause. “A public employee’s pension constitutes
an element of compensation, and a vested contractual right to pension benefits accrues upon acceptance of employment. Such a pension right may not be destroyed, once vested, without impairing a
contractual obligation of the employing public entity.” 51 At this
point, the California Constitution, if it has any role to play to all, is
used to frustrate any opportunities to put the state pension system
back on rational grounds. Indeed, this decision is not unique. The situation is sufficiently confusing that this question should be asked:
does the decision of the California courts to interpret, alter and
amend a provision of the Charter so narrowly impair the rights reserved by the City under the Charter—rights which normal conceptions of the police power often hold to be nonwaivable in any event?
The verdict on this case is still out, but it is clear from the decision
of the Illinois Supreme Court in Kanerva v. Weems52 that state constitutions can be used to vest rights against the state in ways that are
clearly antithetical to the general efforts to create a system of more

50 No. 1-12-CV 225926 (Super. Ct. Santa Clara Cnty. Dec. 20, 2013) (unreported tent.
decision), available at https://www.sanjoseca.gov/DocumentCenter/View/25342.
51 Betts, 582 P.2d at 617. The decision does not stand alone. See also Allen, 287 P.2d
at 765, cited in San Jose Police Officers’ Ass’n, No. 1-12-CV-225926 at 7–8.
52 13 N.E.3d 1228 (Ill. 2014).
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limited and responsive government. At issue in that case was the
proper interpretation of Article XIII, § 5 of the 1970 Illinois Constitution, which reads "[m]embership in any pension or retirement system
of the State . . . shall be an enforceable contractual relationship, the
benefits of which shall not be diminished or impaired." The Illinois
Supreme Court treated this clause as though it were subject to no exceptions, notwithstanding the perilous financial position of the state,
and then decided that this powerful interpretation covered both the
pension and healthcare system under the state, invoking the rule that
the provision should be “liberally construed in favor of the rights of
the pensioner.”53
The dark side of state constitutional law should now be clear, at
least to this extent. The interpretation of state constitutions is subject
to the same vagaries as the interpretation of the federal constitution.
It is ironic that the protection afforded to these contracts is far
stronger than that which is likely to be found under the federal Contracts Clause, which often carries with it a large police power exception. Indeed, there is at least a respectable argument that the systematic disregard of the “alter and amend” provisions means that the
state’s judicial decision in San Jose Police Officers might violate the federal Contract or Takings Clauses, at least if these apply to judicial
actions—a topic on which there is today much confusion. 54 The point
here should be clear enough. The advocates of both limited government and big government can seek to use the contracts clause to their
private advantage. The double-edged sword is all too apparent,
given the short shrift that some, but not all, state courts, give to the

Id. at 1239.
Please see Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dept. of Envtl. Prot., 560 U.S. 702
(2010), on which my views are found in Richard A. Epstein, Littoral Rights Under the
Takings Doctrine: The Clash Between the Ius Naturale and Stop the Beach Renourishment,
6 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 37 (2011).
53
54
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protection of the state’s interest in the enforcement of its own charter
provisions and pension arrangements.
III. PUBLIC EDUCATION UNDER STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
A similar line of argumentation applies to the question of education. On this point it is clear, as noted, that state constitutions often
impose affirmative obligations on their state governments to run education programs. But much depends on how these obligations are
interpreted, and often it is in a way that can make government even
bigger than it would otherwise be. The leading set of cases in this
regard are the three decisions in Serrano v. Priest,55 in which the California Supreme Court held that it was improper to rely heavily on
local property taxes to fund public education in the state. In dealing
with this issue in 1971, the California Supreme Court quickly rejected
any argument that this result was required by article IX, section 5 of
the California Constitution, "The Legislature shall provide for a system of common schools by which a free school shall be kept up and
supported in each district at least six months in every year . . . ."56 The
point does not seem unreasonable given that the last clause—“at least
six months in every year”—contemplates that some districts may go
above any minimum level if their finances permit it, even if others do
not. Rather than fight the particulars of this state constitutional provision, Serrano I found that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution applied to state
education, particularly to efforts to allow education to turn on the
wealth of individual school districts. 57

55 Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971) (Serrano I); Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d
929 (Cal. 1976) (Serrano II); Serrano v. Priest, 569 P.2d 1303 (Cal. 1977) (Serrano III).
56 Serrano I, 487 P.2d at 1248.
57 “We are called upon to determine whether the California public school financing
system, with its substantial dependence on local property taxes and resultant wide

2015]

THE DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD

745

The interpretation was surely revolutionary at the time. Although the point is rarely mentioned today, any successful interpretation of the clause has to give equal stress to the words “equal” and
“protection,” where the latter term was used in its ordinary sense at
the time, noting that all persons were entitled to the equal protection
of the criminal and civil law against their selective enforcement. The
protection probably extended to those cases where the state engaged,
often on grounds of race, in differential prosecution of various offenders, or in the alternative on differential insulation for certain individuals from prosecution on the basis of race. Under the applicable
constitutional law of the time, it is highly unlikely that the equal protection guarantee was seen as having anything whatsoever to do
with the distribution of government benefits—a development that
took place only much later, and most emphatically with Brown.
The argument that the Equal Protection Clause was ever intended to revolutionize the funding of public education was always
a stretch, and when the issue came before the United States Supreme
Court in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,58 a divided Court held that there was no obligation of any state to redistribute resources across local county and municipal lines. The California Supreme Court refused to follow those decisions. Thus stymied on its reading of the federal constitution, in Serrano II it announced that it read California’s Equal Protection Clause in line with
its earlier reading of the federal constitution, before Rodriguez came

disparities in school revenue, violates the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. We have determined that this funding scheme invidiously discriminates
against the poor because it makes the quality of a child's education a function of the
wealth of his parents and neighbors. Recognizing as we must that the right to an education in our public schools is a fundamental interest which cannot be conditioned on
wealth, we can discern no compelling state purpose necessitating the present method
of financing. We have concluded, therefore, that such a system cannot withstand constitutional challenge and must fall before the equal protection clause.” Id. at 1244.
58 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
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down. In so doing, the court did not read the positive grants of power
over the educational system to create the rights in question, even
though it might have had the power to do so.
At this point, it should be clear that one of the ironies of our federalist system is that the identical clause could be interpreted in opposite fashions by the United States Supreme Court and various state
supreme courts. The double-dip theory of state constitutionalism,
however, does not give us any clue as to which of these interpretations should be preferred and why. If Serrano I and Serrano II are regarded as constitutional mistakes, then the opportunity afforded for
state experimentation is a negative and not a positive. Indeed, one
way to read the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is as a break on state power, which is supposed to be enforced
by appropriate congressional legislation. But it is a mistake, I think,
to tie any uneasiness with Serrano to the Equal Protection Clause, because it is perfectly clear that state supreme courts can use clauses
similar to article IX, section 5 of the California Constitution to achieve
that same end.
Many states have chosen to rely on specific grants of powers to
their legislatures to reach the result in Serrano. For these purposes, I
shall confine my attention to the single, but exhaustive, Kentucky Supreme Court decision in Rose v. Council for Better Education, Inc., 59
which imposed its own extensive program of financial equalization
through the lens of Section 183 of the Kentucky Constitution, enacted
in 1891, which provides: “The General Assembly shall, by appropriate legislation, provide for an efficient system of common schools
throughout the State." The leverage for the massive judicial intervention was the term “efficient,” which according to Rose, in the Kentucky constitutional sense, was defined as a system that required

59

790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989).
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"substantial uniformity, substantial equality of financial resources
and substantial equal educational opportunity for all students." 60
“Efficient” was also interpreted in light of expert evidence to require
that the educational system must be adequate, uniform and unitary,
such that “students must be given equal educational opportunities,
regardless of economic status, or place of residence”—whereby "efficient" involves “pay and training of teachers, school buildings, other
teaching staff, materials, and adequacy of all educational resources.”61 At no point does “efficiency” in this account carry with it
the usual economic meaning of extracting maximum social value out
of scarce resources.
In dealing with these two issues, the case for or against equalization should not depend on the particular clause used to impose the
fiscal duties upon the state. The decisions in both Serrano and Rose
are dubious from the general perspective of limited government, under which it is the function of government to provide for public
goods, rather than to redistribute wealth among its various citizens.
The issue in this regard is actually very complicated because any system of state-funded education, no matter where done and how implemented, necessarily has some powerful redistributive consequences that can neither be ignored nor eliminated. Let any individual school district have rich and poor neighborhoods, then prima facie it looks as though families in the first group necessarily subsidize
the education of those in the second group.
The size of any such subsidy is difficult to specify in the abstract,
for it depends at least in part on the number of children in the two
groups who attend public school, and the differential costs in providing those services, assuming that there is (as there is not) some way

60
61

Id. at 191–92.
Id. at 210–11.
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of standardizing the benefit packages received. On this score, moreover, it is not clear exactly what is to be equalized. Richer students
live in nicer homes and their parents are prepared to pay for nicer
schools. Does school equalization require all amenities to be equalized, or just those issues—assuming we can identify them—that pertain exclusively or predominantly to the quality of education provided? Poorer students are likely to have more behavioral problems
and special needs. They are likely to have greater need for school
lunches and other support services. Do these costly services have to
be supplied as well, even if it means a higher per capita expenditure
in poor rather than rich districts? The situation is complicated when
large numbers of students use either private or religious schools. It is
made still more difficult by trying to factor in the extensive amount
of federal cash support—and the onerous burdens of federal regulations—on the operation of various school systems, both public and
private. The effort to create state funding for the issue is one that will
redress district-wide grievances, but it is an open question as to just
how far that equalization should go in light of the multiple difficulties in running these vast systems. The California system prior to Serrano I, and the Kentucky system prior to Rose, had both built in previously some measure of state equalization payments, which makes
it hard to believe that either the Equal Protection Clause, or any general state mandate to introduce, fund and support public schools, can
be read with sufficient precision to tell what level of subsidies ought
to exist, and why.62 Indeed, one position that looks very much beyond the pale is one that requires absolute equality in expenditures

62 As a side note, the ruling in Serrano I led to the adoption of Proposition 13, commonly known as the Jarvis-Gann Amendment, in 1978, which disrupted real estate
taxation in California over the next forty years. Jarvis-Gann was upheld against federal
constitutional challenge in Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1 (1992). Its role as a response
to Serrano I is discussed in Isaac Martin, Does School Finance Litigation Cause Taxpayer
Revolt? Serrano and Proposition 13, 40 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 525 (2006).
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across districts, which could easily ignore the different costs of school
construction, student needs, and faculty hiring in different districts.
The Equal Protection Clause does not read as if it confers a generalized ratemaking authority on courts. And the specific state constitutional provisions restricting public school systems do not turn over
vast levels of authority to impose those restrictions either. Nor do
they appear to allow courts to impose on state legislatures the extensive obligation to require additional taxation. Institutionally, the
point here is that if there is no workable theory of remediation, the
highly expansive reading of entitlements ought to be curtailed, leaving matters up to the legislature, as imperfect as that is.
The situation is further clouded because it seems clear that redistribution of wealth is not the only consequence that will flow from
the radical restructuring of state funding. Once the funding goes to
the State, then most of the control over local education on such matters as the selection of textbooks and the organization of curriculum
will necessarily migrate to the center of the state. That shift of power
has two serious downsides: first, it negates the benefits of local
knowledge, and second, it weakens the exit options of individual taxpayers that otherwise constrain misbehavior by local governments.
The increased funds therefore need not work any improvement in
the overall operation of schools, and there is pretty good empirical
evidence that the overall level of school performance has not improved since the massive infusion of state and federal funds into
public education programs since Serrano I was decided in 1971. 63

63 For a balanced account of these issues, see ERIC A. HANUSHEK & ALFRED A.
LINDSETH, SCHOOLHOUSES, COURTHOUSES, AND STATEHOUSES: SOLVING THE FUNDINGACHIEVEMENT PUZZLE IN AMERICA’S PUBLIC SCHOOLS (2009).
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Look at these graphs that relate performance to funding and class
size and decide for yourself:64

64 The first graph is available here: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/billgates/bill-gates-school-performance_b_829771.html. The second is available here:
https://nces.ed.gov/programs/coe/indicator_clr.asp.
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The punch line from these two graphs is that higher expenditures
and smaller classes have not done much to improve the system of
public education. The question then arises of how best to explain the
changes. On this score the first point to note is that finances are only
a very small part of the overall picture. What goes on in the classroom
and larger society makes a huge difference as well. One serious problem is that students who come to school today often come from single-parent households or broken families, so that schools have to pick
up a larger share of the basic caring function for nutrition and health
matters, for example. These students from unstable or vulnerable
family environments also tend to miss classes and have some serious
personal issues, not necessarily of their own making. Family instability often leads to frequent moves that put additional strains on the
overall operation of the educational system. Gone are the days when
in public schools the return rates from year-to-year were high—in my
own instance at P.S. 161 in Brooklyn, over 90 percent each year, even
in large classes.
Next there is the heavy regulatory burden, which has mushroomed exponentially since Serrano I was decided. Whatever the
topic, there is more oversight from both state and federal governments. Dear Colleague letters from the Department of Justice and the
Office of Civil Rights impose extensive compliance costs on schools,
as issues of race, sex, and disability are always raised to the top of the
agenda, where they divert energy from teaching and resources from
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public administration.65 If the mandate for an efficient public education system could bind the federal program, the aggregate data
would point to their prompt elimination.
That state of affairs is exceedingly difficult to remedy at the state
level, given that state rules cannot preempt federal rules. But there is
one thing that can be done on the state level that could transform the
basic operation of public schools: declare public unions unconstitutional under state law. Ironically, this is a hard argument to make
under the state Equal Protection Clauses, which have generally been
rate to mandate massive redistribution. But they can be made with
much greater ease under specific state constitutional guarantees that
talk about the need to have “efficient” public school systems, for the
simple reason that any system that entrenches a monopoly union
cannot be efficient by the normal economic tests that prefer competition, even among branches of government, to monopoly institutions.
The simple argument here is that the general view of the public trust
translates into a constitutional norm that “public resources [shall not]
be given to private use, without just compensation.” 66 The acceptance of union representation of teachers amounts to a violation
of the public trust by giving away public assets in exchange for services of higher quality that could be acquired at a lower price, as is
made evident by this basic chart that compares public school and
charter school teachers:67

65 I discuss these in Richard A. Epstein, Civil Rights Enforcement Gone Haywire: The
Federal Government’s New School-Discipline Policy, 14 EDUC. NEXT 29, (2014), 29, available
at http://educationnext.org/civil-rights-enforcement-gone-haywire/.
66 For development of the theme, see Richard A. Epstein, The Public Trust Doctrine,
7 CATO J. 411 (1987).
67 Note that the longer term of service of public school teachers is no clear sign of
better educational skills, for it is consistent with retention because of serious job protections.
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The basic principle of a public trust is that it requires that the
state never give away assets to private parties unless they receive an
equal value in return. That is never the case with respect to public
school teachers who are protected by a collective bargaining agreement that allows them to obtain supra competitive wages, judged in
this instance against the charter school benchmark. What is striking
about the current law on the Serrano standards is that it for the most
part speaks only of various funding obligations. It talks about the redistribution of funds across districts, but it never once notes that one
of the reasons why higher expenditures on public education have not
resulted in improved levels of student performance is that the increased strength of the public teachers union has siphoned off in the
form of monopoly rents the increased revenues that were intended
to equalize education. Unless and until the courts look at allocative
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efficiency as well as wealth redistribution, they will never be able to
get to the bottom of the current situation, where higher revenues
have not translated into improved performance for students. A
frontal assault on the entire union structure is consistent with the
general framework that should be applicable to our basic constitutional structure.
As of this writing, there is no court that has had the temerity, or
good judgment, to push hard down this road. But there are signs that
the log jam may be breaking on this issue. In the recent decision in
Vergara v. California,68 Judge Rolf M. Treu struck down three provisions of the California Education Code as inconsistent with the Equal
Protection Clause of the California Constitution. The doctrinal analysis rested on a bare recitation of key passages from Brown and Serrano, coupled with obligatory references to the two provisions of the
California Constitution that were put to one side in Serrano. From
those passages, he concluded that the state has a compelling state interest to supply education to all students within the state on equal
terms, which translated into the use of a strict-scrutiny standard.69
The decision seems correct given the enormous impact that California teachers unions have exerted in both electoral and legislative politics.70
Doctrine was not the purpose of this exercise. Instead the judge
targeted three provisions of the California Education Code. Section
343929.21(b) was a provision that guaranteed permanent employ-

68 No. BC484642 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 27, 2014).
69 Id. at 8–9.
70 Troy Senik, Op-Ed., The Teachers Union That’s Failing California: Why Are State
Schools in Trouble? Start with the California Teachers Assn., L.A. TIMES (May 18, 2012),
http://articles.latimes.com/2012/may/18/opinion/la-oe-senik-california-teachersassociation-20120518.
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ment to newly hired teachers after a stated two years of service; Section 44934, 44928(b)(a) 7(2) and section 44944 imposed strong restrictions on the ability of the School District to fire ineffective teachers; and Section 44955 imposed a strict Last-in-First Out (“LIFO”)
rule on dismissals in the event of an economic contraction. All of
these statutes were declared unconstitutional.
The logic of this decision reveals the conscious conflation of liberty with equality interests. The basic charge was that the protective
barriers used to surround teachers were certain to compromise “the
basic equality of educational opportunity.” The difficulty with that
inequality argument is that a uniformly corrupt system of protective
legislation does not discriminate against any particular group of students. What it does is lower the quality of education below that
which all students should receive. In order to get to that point, Judge
Treu quickly transformed his inquiry from one of the equality of educational opportunities, to one about the quality of those opportunities, which he found sorely lacking. In making this judgment he relied on evidence offered by the defendant (and sponsored in part by
the Gates Foundation, which has been active in this area) that the single largest determinant of student success is the quality of instruction—and not the number of dollars spent within the system. These
difficulties are especially acute with the bottom five percent of teachers, who are the prime beneficiaries of the overall system of legal protections against dismissal. As the plaintiff’s expert testified, “a single
year in a classroom with a grossly ineffective teacher costs students
$1.4 million in lifetime earnings per classroom.” 71 Similarly, “students in LAUSD [Los Angeles Unified School Districts] who are
taught by a teacher in the bottom 5% of competence lose 9.54 months

71

Vergara, No. BC484642 at 4.
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of learning in a single year compared to students with average teachers.”72 I have not reviewed the data behind these statistics, and the
numbers indeed sound large, but the basic point shines through. Inferior instruction by cosseted teachers can nullify much of the purported gains from the wealth transfer system initiated by Serrano and
similar decisions.
Armed with this general conclusion, Judge Treu then attacked
each of the three provisions on sensible social and economic grounds.
The early tenure requirement in essence gives teachers tenure before
the public school evaluation of their first two years of work can be
completed. There is in effect no sensible probation period. The protections against unjust dismissal are far beyond those offered to other
public employees, all of which meet the normal due process standards. The LIFO rule is a per se rule that means that the most recently
hired teachers must be the first to be fired, regardless of their value
to the school system. On a routine basis, within a lockstep wage
structure, this rule requires the dismissal of new teachers with lower
salaries and greater skills than their senior colleagues. The net effect
is that these hiring teachers necessarily prejudice the students who
receive inferior instruction from this skewed hiring system that could
never survive in any competitive industry. The decision in Vergara
did insist that seniority be irrelevant to hiring decisions. But it did
insist that this system was constitutionally defective because it did
not follow the rule in other states, where the Board of Education is
allowed to take seniority into account, without being able to rely on
it exclusively. The California provision of course solidifies the loyalty
of the senior teachers for the union and thus has a corrosive effect on
internal governance along with its negative consequences on instructional quality and its additional charge on budget.

72

Id.
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The union attacks on Vergara have been fierce. What is striking
about them is that they all take dead aim at the Eli Broad and Gates
Foundation, as well as Student Matters, the group that sponsored the
Vergara litigation, on the grounds that these are groups of billionaires
that are intent on taking over the entire system: “the essence of Vergara versus California [is] the corporate reformers' legal assault on
teachers' due process rights. Vergara is one more insidious attempt
by the billionaires to impose a simplistic competition-driven ideology on complex issues of policy and practice.” 73 What is never offered is a substantive defense of the underlying statutes against the
charges in question.
As noted, I regard the Vergara decision as a sensible first step in
an effort to break the union monopoly that constitutes the greatest
threat to superior education in California and elsewhere. It is important to note that education in this regard is not exempt from the
usual observation that gains in allocative efficiency should be implemented before extensive programs of redistribution are applied. That
applies to both political and constitutional remedies of the basic
problem. It also gives a clear guide to both constitutional adjudication and political reform—if this path is taken and cases like Vergara
are not consigned to political oblivion. But even here the irony is that
the arguments in question do not depend on the state, as opposed to
the federal, versions of the Equal Protection Clause. They work
equally well, or equally badly, under both. But the further irony is
that the other state constitutional provisions that do require the creation of public school systems actually offer an easier path to that
result by noting that the state cannot act in good faith to create a uniform, fair and effective public school system if it countenances the
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use of monopoly power against the student population whom they
are under a duty to serve.
IV. CONCLUSION: PUTTING THE PIECES TOGETHER
We are now in a position to survey both the opportunities and
pitfalls of state constitutional law in the domain of economic liberties,
and I dare say everywhere else. These provisions are the very model
of a double-edged sword. State constitutional provisions could provide needed protection for private property, economic liberties and
prudent public expenditures on such topics as pension and education
if they are pressed into service for those ends. But just as the federal
constitution is subject to the radically different interpretations from
the classical liberals and progressives, so too state constitutions are
prey to just that ambiguity. Unfortunately, in most cases where state
courts are dominated by progressive judges, their results will lead
just in that direction. That result is evident in cases dealing with pensions, where the judges adopt an upside-down structure: they are
powerless to prevent excesses of spending that violate every known
principle of actuarial soundness, but all too willing to tolerate early
vesting of pension rights that are inconsistent with the usual rules on
delayed vesting of contract rights. Similarly, with respect to state education, they leap to impose major financial transfers of dubious
value while allowing teachers unions to dominate the classroom
where they impose a systematic threat to educational quality. The recent Vergara decision represents the early sign of a possible return to
saner principles, but that litigation has a long way to go. The perils
that befall it are great, which is the case with all efforts to use state
constitutions to remedy the defects of the modern federal constitutional law. The reason why this paper is called “The Double-Edged
Sword of State Constitutional Law” is that the power to deviate from
federal norms is, as often as it is not, used to make a bad situation
worse.

